If the universe was not determined in some sense, then we could not make any scientific predictions. If, however, we did not have free will to choose among alternatives, there could be no moral judgments. This contentious issue confuses many of us, as we tend to either capitulate to free will and lose scientific predictions (which is often what religions do), or deny free will based on our current successes in empirical predictions (which is often what science does). This post discusses why both these positions are false, and how deterministic predictions can exist without compromising free will and morality.
The previous post examined the materialist critique of freewill, and showed why the reduction of free will to rationality (and then to mechanization of rationality) is flawed because rationality itself involves choices of axioms which themselves cannot be rationalized―i.e. reduced to more fundamental axioms. The only way to solve the problem of free will is to postulate that it is fundamental. This post examines what that free will is, and how it operates and controls the world we live in.